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Abstract: How do the underlying mechanisms of social norms and bargaining power relate to the 
acceptance of intimate partner violence within households?  How do short run and long run 
determinants of gender norms affect attitudes toward IPV?  This study begins to decompose the 
dynamics of the acceptance of IPV within couples using data from the Demographic Health 
Survey, as well as examine the relationship in the context of patriarchal societies using data from 
the Ethnographic Atlas.  I find that females are more accepting than males of intimate partner 
violence, and females becoming more educated is associated with her being less accepting of 
violence, even if her male partner believes it is justifiable.  Additionally, being a member of a 
more patriarchal society is associated with couples disagreeing more often about the acceptability 
of IPV.    
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1.  Introduction  
 The World Health Organization reports that 1 in 3 women worldwide will experience 
sexual and/or physical intimate partner violence in their lifetime (WHO, 2017).  Intimate 
partner violence (IPV)1 refers to coercive and assaultive behaviors that can include physical 
assault of kicking, hitting, or beating; coercive sex; or psychological attacks of humiliation, 
belittling, and intimidation (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005; Ibrahim et al., 2014; Owoaje & 
OlaOlarun, 2012).  Intimate partner violence is associated with poor long-term health status, as 
well as immediate negative physical and mental health effects, such as miscarriages, depression, 
and sexually transmitted infections (Cools & Kotsdam, 2017; Durevall & Lindskog, 2015; 
Krishman, 2005; Yount et al., 2011; Boy & Salihu, 2004; Campbell, 2002; Ellsberg et al., 2008; 
Yount et al., 2015). 
 Despite the unquestionable occurrence of IPV, accurate measurements of the prevalence 
of violent events are limited due to self-reporting, a method commonly leading to 
underreporting.  Aizer (2010) tries to overcome the problem of self-reporting by constructing a 
new measure of domestic violence prevalence.  The author derives this measure from 
“administrative data on female hospitalizations for assault” (Aizer, 2010).  This uses physician 
classifications of the injuries instead of self-reports of incidence, which overcomes one problem 
with the data while creating a new one.  This new measure is still biased downwards, because it 
excludes any domestic violence incidents that did not lead to hospitalization, such as minor 
injuries or psychological attacks. 
 Due to the struggles of measuring the prevalence of IPV with accuracy, this study will 
be using attitudes toward intimate partner violence for its analysis.  Besides being self-reported, 
prevalence of IPV may also be underreported due to social desirability bias (Sugarman & 
Hotaling, 1997).  Social desirability is the idea of answering questions in a way that is perceived 
favorably by others; this can lead to underreporting of undesirable behavior (Sugarman & 
Hotaling, 1997).  There is less social stigma when discussing beliefs about violence than when 
admitting to being a victim or perpetrator of IPV.   
 Additionally, beliefs that IPV is acceptable are a high-risk factor for the increased 
prevalence of IPV, since the social costs of committing violence are diminished as society views 
                                                1	The term ‘domestic violence’ typically refers to partner violence but the term can also encompass child or 
elder abuse, or abuse by any member of a household.  ‘Intimate partner violence’ is between two people who 
have been intimately involved.  	
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it as tolerable (Gelles, 1983).  In various other empirical studies, accepting attitudes and beliefs 
toward IPV were identified as the most important risk factors for the occurrence of violent acts 
(Perez et al., 2006; Perez-Jimenez et al., 2017; Orpinas, 1999; Boyle et al. 2009; Bucheli & Rossi, 
2017).  Although attitudes and prevalence are endogenous with one another, studies continue 
to determine that attitudes of acceptance toward IPV are the strongest predictors of violence 
among other observable traits (Faramariza et al., 2005; Yoshikawa et al., 2014).  These 
connections point to the idea of using attitudes toward IPV as a potential point of intervention 
for policies and programs aimed at reducing the occurrence of violence within households 
(Yount et al., 2015).  This is consistent with studies that conclude attempts to reduce the 
prevalence of IPV can be obstructed by social norms of acceptance of IPV (Bucheli & Rossi, 
2017).  These norms that allow the justification of violence are established through cultures 
that value masculinity, perceive inferior female economic status, and condone female 
domination (Wubs, 2015). 
 Although measures of attitudes are more accurate than prevalence measures and could 
be the key to future policies, there is limited research in this specific area.  Domestic violence 
researchers acknowledge this gap and call for additional studies to be done on these attitudes 
(Krause et al., 2016; Cools & Kotsdam, 2017; Perez-Jimenez et al., 2017; Yoshikawa et al., 2014).  
Not only is there a gap in the literature concerning attitudes, but that gap is widened when the 
search is restricted to male attitudes (Yoshikawa et al., 2014).  This study adds to the existing 
literature by discussing and decomposing couple dynamics of intimate partner violence 
acceptance.  And, to the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to combine data for all 
DHS couples’ surveys available globally in order to investigate correlates of attitudes toward 
intimate partner violence. 
 Furthermore, this study examines the dynamics of acceptance in the context of 
patriarchal and non-patriarchal societies.  We employ agricultural tool usage as long run 
determinants, specifically the plough, to signify which ethnic groups have more patriarchal 
structures.  In societies that implemented hand tools, women tended to work more in 
agricultural activities than men (Boserup, E., 1970).  Contrastingly, in societies that used the 
plough, men labored more in agriculture than women, due to the strength needed to control the 
animal and the tool.  Once the plough had been pulled through a field, there was less need for 
additional tasks to be done by hand, like weeding (Boserup, 1970).   
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 Norms about the role of females in economic activity developed differently based on the 
agricultural tools used.  Ethnic groups containing plough agriculture presented more unequal 
beliefs about the roles of males and females in society, which has persistent until present day 
(Boserup, 1970; Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., & Nunn, N., 2013).  In this paper, I examine whether 
this ancestral differential gender valuation in economic development is reflected in the extent 
to which IPV is accepted and the disagreement within a couples about the acceptance of 
violence.  The concentration on ancestral agricultural tools as an influencer of the acceptance of 
IPV is not meant to suggest that other historical or present-day factors are unconnected in 
determining the extent of acceptance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will include relevant 
literature on social norms and intimate partner violence, where I will present existing research 
on variables that influence IPV.  Section 3 will contain information on the data used in this 
analysis.  Section 4 will include an analysis and discussion of the results.  Section 5 will cover 
concluding remarks. 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1 Social Norms 
 The present paper is related to literature on the determinant of social norms, dynamics 
of violence within a bargaining household, and existing studies on the acceptance of IPV.  
Attitudes towards IPV can be considered an outcome of social norms.  Incorporating multiple 
backgrounds of theory will help identify the variables that influence the acceptance of IPV, 
which will then help target policy and programs more efficiently.  Staveren and Ode bode (2007) 
conducted a case study of the Yoruba women in Nigeria and noted several gendered and 
asymmetric social norms in this society.  These roles are taught to them very early in their 
childhood, and the norms are validated by the community’s shared beliefs (Staveren & Ode bode, 
2007).  These norms became strengthened as more people within the community matched their 
beliefs. 
 Bisin and Verdier (2001) discuss how social norms within a household can be 
transmitted through generations by parents imbuing their preferences into their children’s 
lives.  This transmission comes from a paternalistic altruism called imperfect empathy.  
Socialization within a family and socialization within a society act as the mechanism by which 
social norms are transmitted.  This can be done by imitating role models or learning from peers.  
Interestingly, the long run distribution of preferences is heterogeneous as the norms evolve 
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during their spread.  This progression, however, weighs family socialization too heavily, 
leading to an inefficient process and profile of preferences, where what is normalized within a 
household may not fully line up with social preferences (Bisin & Verdier, 2001).  This can 
prevent more efficient division of roles and divert people from coordination within a household 
and community (Veblen, 1964).   
 It follows that there can also be intergenerational transmission of the norms of 
violence.  A child observing violence between their parents is more likely to be involved in 
violence when they mature (Kalmuss, 1984).  While there are not specific gender effects here, 
the author determines there are specific role effects.  A son observing his father be violent 
against his mother is more likely to be a victim of violence if he takes on a submissive role in his 
own relationship, but he is also more likely to be a perpetrator of violence if he takes on the 
dominant one (Kalmuss, 1984).  Since there is an aspect of acceptance of violence that is learned 
from parents, this same transmission of ideology could happen between partners, as well.  
Elster (2001) reinforces the idea of inefficient role division.  Economics as a field relies 
on homo economicus when creating theory and expectations for behavior; it requires people be 
rational decision makers.  However, the world more realistically contains homo sociologicus, 
whose behaviors are dictated by social norms.  Decision makers cannot always be assumed to be 
outcome oriented, meaning that social norms can influence the manner by which someone 
makes a choice more heavily than rationality (Elster, 2001).  Even though domestic violence 
does not lead to an efficient distribution of welfare in a household, preferences toward 
dominance and punishment can still lead to the decision to commit intimate partner violence. 
 Thorstein Veblen (1964) saw gender norms as institutions that influenced the 
“economic process of provisioning today” through cultural patterns.  The author felt 
institutional economists often ignored gendered institutions, so he used these norms to 
examine the influence of ideology and power on the economy (Veblen, 1964).  Burda, 
Hamermesh, and Weil (2007) consider social norms as economic determinants, specifically that 
different social norms of leisure established total work for men and women.  Total work comes 
from market work and non-market work together, and in wealthier countries, total work is the 
same for both genders.  There is a negative relationship between the gendered total work 
differential (per day) and real GDP per capita (Burda, et. al., 2007).  
 Using twenty-five countries, they determined males and females have the same levels of 
total work, although many fields believe female levels are higher due to higher levels of non-
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market work.  Because there is intrahousehold variation in the total work by gender, family 
level norms are not likely to be the source of the gendered work differentials.  The authors 
theorize that social norms are better suited to explain why the gender differential is smaller 
within education group or within region, instead of between group differences (Burda, et. al., 
2007).  
 Based on the original hypothesis by Boseup (1970), Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) 
are able to trace the use of the plough in agriculture to current persisting gender norms.  
Ethnic groups that used the plough, as opposed to hand tools, were more reliant on male labor, 
due to the physical strength required for this technology.  This created social norms that males 
were more valuable to economic activity than females in those ethnic groups.  This reinforces 
the idea of intergenerational transmission of social norms and the persistence of those norms 
over time. 
 Alesina et. al. find that societies that traditionally used the plough in agriculture have 
more unequal gender norms, which is measured through attitudes and female economic 
participation.  The author strengthen their conclusions by also testing if immigrants to the 
United States and Europe who originated in societies that used the plough had less equal views 
on gender norms.  They find these groups have more unequal beliefs about gender and violence 
than those without that connection (Alesina et. al., 2013).   In a related study using data from 
the continent of Africa, researchers connect present attitudes about spousal violence to various 
ancestral traits in order to bring a focus to the significance of considering deeply rooted social 
norms when creating programs and policies meant to eliminate partner violence (Alesina, 
Brioschi, & La Ferrara 2016). 
2.2 Domestic Violence & Bargaining 
 There is evidence that women with higher levels of education have lower levels of 
acceptance of IPV (Jewkes, 2002; Martin et. al., 1999; Steinmets, 1987).  Obtaining education 
alters a female’s self-confidence, social networks, and ability to use her resources, which 
increases her levels of empowerment (Jewkes, 2002).  This author concludes that the dynamic 
between education and IPV is intricate, meaning other factors also influence the impact, like 
education levels relative to those of a spouse. 
Referring back to the study on the Yoruba women, an additional social norm exists that 
discussing personal income is inappropriate, even within a household (Staveren & Ode bode, 
2007).  Both partners are expected to earn an income; however, each is expected to control their 
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own money so there is no pooled income (Staveren & Ode bode, 2007).  In relation to household 
models, the absence of income pooling undermines the unitary model, as well as any idea of 
cooperative bargaining.  A man in the Yoruba society would have the dominant gender role; he 
could easily assume his income is higher than his partner’s, because the social norms drive 
women to unpaid, non-market work (Staveren & Ode bode, 2007). 
 Sociology has theories about what changes the rate of domestic violence 
occurrence.  Socio-cultural models of “male backlash” predict that as women’s wages increase, 
violence against them increases because men feel their traditional gender role threatened 
(Macmillan & Gartner, 1999).  As a ‘breadwinner,’ a male partner could see that status being 
diminished if his female partner becomes employed.  However, in this case, the female is coming 
from a status below her husband to a status equal or similar to his own.  This is not the 
situation Macmillan et. al. refers to when they hypothesize “male backlash.”  The authors 
discuss how men feel the need to maintain their dominance if he and his wife are both 
unemployed and then she becomes employed.  In this case, both were in an equal position, and 
then the wife takes the dominant role.  IPV can be seen as a source of satisfaction, and as a way 
to control the partner’s behavior.  The measurements completed in this study came from a 1993 
Violence Against Women Survey conducted by Statistics Canada (Macmillan & Gartner, 
1999).  The incidences of intimate partner violence were self-reported by the women, which 
could lead to biased results due to under-reporting.   
 An early sociologist incorporates economic bargaining theory into his examination of 
the causes of domestic violence.  Gelles (1983) combines social control theory and exchange 
theory to pinpoint three situations that contribute to domestic violence—when the rewards to 
violence outweigh the cost of violence; when there are lacks of social controls or norms that 
effectively discourage violence; and when perceptions of inequality and masculinity also reduce 
the costs of being violent.  These situations exist because the reward from being violent 
(reaffirming inequality) is high.  This theory holds if there is no bargaining between partners, 
meaning one partner consistently benefits from the situation without providing any benefits to 
their partner, but if there is any bargaining ability, the partner not receiving any benefits (but 
receiving the abuse) will leave the relationship (Gelles, 1983).  The author does point out that a 




2.3 Attitudes Toward Intimate Partner Violence 
 Researchers have begun using attitudes toward spousal violence as a measure of 
prevalence and social norms, but many studies fail to include both female and male attitudes.  
While these studies are useful in identifying variables that may push acceptance around, they 
potentially miss out on any relationship a female’s observable traits have relative to her 
partner’s.   
 Income shocks traced back to changing algae populations in Indonesian show women 
become less accepting of domestic violence as her share of household income increases, and her 
bargaining power increases, consistent with the non-cooperative bargaining model (Krupoff et. 
al., 2018).  In communities of Sub-Saharan African with higher levels of female acceptance of 
IPV, women who are employed face a greater risk of experience spousal violence (Cools & 
Kotsdam, 2017).  In Uruguay, using data from a survey of women done by the National 
Innovation Agency and UNICEF, researchers concluded age did not influence a female’s 
acceptance of violence, but experiencing violence as a child led an adult woman to be tolerant of 
intimate partner violence (Bucheli & Rossi, 2017).  In Tanzania, a cross-sectional study 
determined age, employment, education, and motherhood were all factors that influenced a 
women’s risk of experiencing IPV (Prabhu et al., 2001).  This study also concluded that HIV 
counseling and testing centers were a useful location to implement programs for IPV screening 
and counseling (Prabhu et al., 2001).  Numerous other studies also conclude socio-economic 
factors are useful in uncovering what determines IPV and women’s tolerant attitudes towards 
it (Owoaje & OlaOlorun, 2012; Allen & Raghallaigh, 2013; Linos et al., 2013; Olayanju et al., 
2013; Kwagala et al., 2013). 
 However, there is a growing body of research that examines both female and male 
acceptance of spousal violence (Abiona & Koppensteiner, 2016; Wubs, 2015; Allen & Devitt, 
2012; Perez-Jimenez et al., 2017).  In a survey done in 2011 in Nepal, results concluded that 
there was no significant difference between acceptance levels of females and males (Yoshikawa 
et al., 2014).  A survey of 13 countries from various regions of the world found that women 
were more accepting of spousal violence in 54% of cases.  Men were more accepting of violence 
in countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Tran et. al., 2016).  This article did include a 
more extensive analysis of female’s attitudes, because the authors had data from an additional 
twenty-six countries on females.  Even though both men and women were included in this 
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study, the number of countries with data available on men illustrates the disparity in 
knowledge on males’ acceptance of violence.  
 A study found that women are more accepting (73.4%) of intimate partner violence 
across various scenarios than males (56.9%) in Uganda (Speizer, 2010).  Interestingly, the 
author concludes these results must be specific to Uganda due to cultural context.  A 
population-based survey from Rwanda found that females are 14.3% more likely to be exposed 
to acts of IPV than males (Umubyeyi, 2014).  In Vietnam, 65.4% of men are tolerant of spousal 
violence, and 91.7% of women are tolerant (Krause et al., 2016).  Again, the authors determine 
the cultural context of their study is the reason for such striking results and that additional 
research is needed to understand why females are more accepting than men (Krause et al., 
2016).  Additionally, research conducted in the cultural context of sub-Saharan Africa (Uthman, 
Lawoko & Moradi, 2009) and the entire continent of Africa (Alesina, Brioschi & La Ferrara, 
2016) found consistent results.  Females are more accepting of intimate partner violence than 
males.  The results from my study support the existing literature and expand it to a global 
context across almost twenty years. 
 
3. Data Sources 
The gap between partner attitudes toward domestic violence and the correlation 
between couples’ attitudes has not been explored near as extensively as female attitudes alone.  
Weather or income shocks are likely to alter or create a divergence of opinions within a couple, 
but currently that analysis type is sparse.  Leaving out half of the partnership when thinking 
about domestic violence, its causes, and the variables that alter its prevalence, does not capture 
the whole picture.  In order to address the two separate categories of research questions, I first 
examine the total DHS couples’ data, before combining it with the data on agricultural tools 
from the Ethnographic Atlas.   
3.1 DHS Data 
To link couples’ attitudes toward intimate partner violence, I draw on from the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), a collection of nationally representative samples of 
women (generally 15-49) and of men (generally 15-59).  The household characteristics are 
combined with the domestic violence module2 to conduct this study.  Even though the DHS is 
                                                
2 The domestic violence module is an optional questionnaire add-on to the standard DHS model, therefore, 
not every country and year has this data available.   
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designed to allow for cross-survey and cross-country comparisons, completed questionnaires 
may differ occasionally between those units.  In order to be included in this study, surveys must 
include both female and male responses to the domestic violence module, which includes the 
attitudes toward IPV questions.  Due to that criterion, only Couples Recode3 surveys 
completed after the year 2000 can be included, meaning this paper uses 113 surveys in 56 
countries from five DHS-defined regions of Sub Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South & 
Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe & Western Africa (See Table 1 for a list of 
countries and survey years).  
 This study exploits a set of attitudinal measures that reflect when an individual is 
accepting of intimate partner violence.  Respondents are asked if a husband is justified in 
beating his wife if she (i) burns the food, (ii) goes out without telling him, (iii) neglects the 
children, (iv) refuses sex, and (v) argues with her husband4.  Both males and females are asked 
these questions in order to determine the total level of acceptance of violence.  While the 
survey does also contain questions about prevalence, this five-part question about attitudes 
helps determine when people believe IPV is justifiable, and it can be used in analysis as the 
measure for when violence acceptance shifts.   
3.2 Ethnographic Atlas Data 
In addition, we use data on ancestral agricultural tools used in preindustrial societies by 
different ethnicities.  The Ethnographic Atlas (EA) is our data source for tool usage; our sample 
comprises the 102,569 couples with plough data by ethnic group.  The measure of plough 
agriculture is constructed from the variable v39 of the Ethnographic Atlas, which is a dataset 
that contains information on 1,265 ethnic groups (Murdock, 1967). 
The variable v39 sorts each ethnic group into one of the following categories: (1) the 
plough was absent, (2) the plough existed at the time the group was observed, but it was not 
aboriginal, and (3) the plough was aboriginal, having existed prior to contact. Using this data, I 
create an indicator variable that equals one if the plough was ever adopted (categories 2 and 3) 
and zero otherwise (category1).  The sample of the DHS merged with the EA has 85,748 
couples from non-plough ethnic groups and 16,339 couples from plough groups.   
                                                
3 The Couples Recode survey includes male and female pairs of data for cohabitating and/or married couples.	
4 The exact phrasing varied slightly in some countries: if food is late or not well prepared (Cambodia); if the 
wife does not cook food properly and if the wife neglects the house or children (India); if the wife fails to 
provide food on time (Bangladesh). 	
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4. Results & Discussion 
I start by documenting the key fact that underlies our analysis: females are more 
accepting of intimate partner violence than males at the population level as well as intracouple.  
I then introduce the use of the Ethnographic Atlas in tandem with the DHS to present long run 
factors. Additionally, we incorporate rainfall data as a short run economic shock into the 
combined DHS and EA dataset.  We conclude this section by documenting similar relationships 
between socioeconomic factors and acceptance of IPV, regardless of plough usage. 
4.1 Documenting Relationships 
I initiate the analysis by observing the raw data.  In this global DHS sample, the 
average age for females is 31.5 years and 37.4 for males.  The difference in means could be due 
to the male sample having a larger age range than the female sample.  Females have, on 
average, 5.1 years of education, while males have a mean of 6.3 years of education.  Sixty-five 
percent of the sample lives in rural areas.  Forty-two percent are categorized as poor by the 
wealth index (in the lowest two quintiles of the index), and 38% are categorized as rich (in the 
highest two quintiles of the index) (See Table 2).  There are 437,873 couples in this data. 
 Across the sample, 46.2% of females are willing to justify IPV in any scenario, while 
only 31.6% of males are willing to accept in the same situations.  When broken out into each 
scenario, females are more accepting of IPV than males—in each case, by more than 10 
percentage points.  For neglecting children, the most accepted situation, 41.8% of females felt 
IPV was justified, and only 27.6% of males felt the same (See Figure 1).  Globally, females and 
males seem to rank neglecting children as the most acceptable situation in which to beat a 
female, then goes out without permission, argues with spouse, refuses sex, and burns food (See 
Table 3).  The relationship between gender and justification can be broken out into various 
other categories. 
 The Sub Saharan Africa region has the highest levels of acceptance of the five regional 
groups of the DHS, which are above the global averages.  Females are more accepting of IPV 
across all five situations.  The scenario where a wife neglects the children has the highest 
acceptance of violence rate for males and females.  Latin America, contrastingly, has the lowest 
acceptance of IPV, with all means below 13% acceptance.  At the lowest levels, only 4.3% of 
females and 2.0% of males accept in the case of burns food—this is much lower than the global 
averages of 16.2% and 7.1%, respectively.  
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 In South and Southeast Asia, females are more accepting than males in every situation.  
Males are similarly accepting of IPV in the cases of going out and arguing at 25% and 23%.  
Additionally, females have very similar acceptance levels for refusing sex and burning food, at 
15.7% and 14.3%.  None of the average acceptance levels are this similar for females. 
 The gender differentials in Central Europe have a greater variance than the other 
regions.  For males, neglecting children and arguing are the situations with the highest levels 
of acceptance, while females rank the five situations in the same order as the global averages 
and the other regions.  Males are more accepting of violence than females for the argues 
situation by 7.0 percentage points, and both genders are equally accepting in the situation 
where a wife goes out without permission.  Females are more accepting of IPV than males in 
the scenarios of refusing sex and burning food.  These are similar to the Central European 
results presented in Tran et al., 2016.   
 A visual representation of the extent at which females and males acceptance IPV can be 
found in Figure 4.  The maps display country-level acceptance across the five scenarios 
presented in the DHS.  A similar visualization is presented in Figure 5 that displays the 
country-level average of disagreement intracouple concerning the acceptability of IPV.  The 
higher levels indicate higher disagreement. 
 As we examine the same distributions across years of schooling, we see an interesting 
picture about the relationship between IPV and education (See Figure 3 for Figures 3A-3E).  
Low education is defined as having no education or primary education, while high education is 
defined as secondary and above.  The level of education does not change males acceptance of 
IPV in any of the scenarios; however, using the ksmirnov test, we can determine that female 
acceptance distributions are statistically smaller for high education than low education in each 
situation.  A more educated female is less accepting of IPV than a female with lower education 
levels; this is consistent with existing literature.   
4.2 Long Run Determinants  
In the DHS sample with the Ethnographic Atlas data, the average age for females is 
30.5 years and 38.0 for males.  Females have, on average, 3.6 years of education, while males 
have a mean of 5.0 years of education.  Seventy percent of the sample lives in rural areas.  
Forty-four percent are categorized as poor by the wealth index (in the lowest two quintiles of 
the index), and 37% are categorized as rich (in the highest two quintiles of the index) (See 
Table 2).  There are 102,569 couples in this data. 
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Across the sample, 57.3% of females are willing to justify IPV in any scenario, while 
only 35.9% of males are willing to accept in the same situations.  When broken out into each 
scenario, females are more accepting of IPV than males—in each case, by more than 10 
percentage points.  For neglecting children, the most accepted situation, 51.7% of females felt 
IPV was justified, and only 31.2% of males felt the same (See Figure 1 and Table 3).   
 To estimate the relationship of patriarchal societies with acceptance of IPV, I implement 
a pooled OLS specification on repeated cross-sections at the country and the ethnicity level to 
compare changes in the extent of acceptance and disagreement about acceptance intracouple in 
households in plough and non-plough ethnic groups.  I employ three outcome variables:  one 
being the female extent of acceptance, the male extent of acceptance, and the disagreement 
measure.  I run the following regression 
Yiect = α + β1 Ploughie + βoXiect +εiect                                          (1) 
 
where Plough is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the ancestral ethnic group used 
the plough; X is a vector of controls including age, education, wealth, and if a household is in a 
rural area; and ε is the error term.  Since it is typical to cluster standard errors at the level at 
which treatment was assigned, I cluster standard errors at the ethnicity level because the 
‘treatment variable’ of the plough is assigned by ethnicity.  It is also likely that outcomes are 
correlated across couples within an ethnic group. 
In some cases, the regression will be run conditional on the partner accepting or never 
accepting violence5.  This is included in order to determine if couple dynamics are a driving 
force in the extent to which IPV is accepted, which has been excluded from prior research in 
this field. 
Finally, in some instances, I will include country fixed effects in order to account for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics that may influence the dependent variables.  
However, there is low to no country level variation of plough use based on ethnicity, so there is 
not enough identifying variation when using fixed effects.  Including the fixed effects does 
allow for a within-country examination of the long run factors. 
 The first outcome variable of interest is the female extent of acceptance, which is the 
total number of times a female states she believes beating a wife is acceptable.  I construct this 
                                                
5 This is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if a respondent said ‘yes’ to any of the 
violence questions and 0 if a respondent does not say ‘yes’ to the five scenarios. 
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variable by summing the number of times a female responds “yes” to any of the five questions 
about IPV on the DHS.  This variable can take on the values 0 – 5.  
Initially we examine the relationship between female extent and socioeconomic factors, 
conditional on male acceptance levels (See Table 5).  Being in an ethnic group with ancestral 
connections to plough usage has a positive relationship with female extent of acceptance for the 
unconditional sample and when a male partner does not believe IPV is justifiable in any of the 
five scenarios.  There is not a significant relationship when a male partner believes IPV is 
justifiable; however, the sign of the coefficient is consistent with the other results reported in 
the table. 
A household moving up the wealth index is associated with a female becoming less 
accepting of IPV, indicating there is a relationship between poverty and women believing IPV 
is justified.  Correspondingly, if a household is in a rural area, a female is more likely to have a 
higher total acceptance level, conditional on a male partner’s acceptance.  The relationship 
between rural location and female extent becomes more significant when we look within a 
country (See Table 6).  These two results remain when running the regression conditional on 
male partners accepting violence in any of the five scenarios or never accepting it.   
 An increase in a female’s age is associated with a decrease in acceptance of IPV, 
regardless of her male partner’s belief about violence. This is consistent with existing 
conclusions that permeate the domestic violence literature.  Female years of education remain 
influential on female extent of acceptance, regardless of her partner’s total acceptance (Table 4).  
Because this relationship is maintained even when a male partner believes IPV is justifiable, 
this could be a key channel for policy makers to exploit. 
 Using country fixed effects, we can examine variation in acceptance of IPV within 
couples for each country with the same specification (See Table 6).  Due to a lack of variation 
within country on plough use, the relationship between plough and female extent of acceptance 
does not remain significant.  The remaining vector of controls is virtually unaffected by the 
additional of the country fixed effects. 
 A country-level measure of plough use and societal characteristics, originally assembled 
by Alesina, et al., 2013 based on the Ethnographic Atlas, are also included for a more robust 
exploration of the relationship between female extent of acceptance and patriarchal societies 
(See Table 11).   The positive coefficients for the plough remain; however, the relationship 
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between country-level plough and female extent is only significant when a male partner reports 
that IPV is acceptable.    
The next outcome variable is male extent of acceptance, which is constructed the same 
as the female extent.  This variable is the number of times a male responds “yes” to any of the 
five questions about IPV on the DHS.  This variable can take on the values 0 – 5. 
 A similar analysis is conducted with male extent as the dependent variable, and it is 
conditional on an indicator for female acceptance or not. When fixed effects are not included, 
being in an ethnic group with ancestral connections to plough usage has a relationship with the 
extent to which a male believes IPV is acceptable, in all of the three specifications.  The 
coefficients are positive; indicating being in a more patriarchal society is associated with higher 
levels of male acceptance of IPV (See Table 7).  Yet again, when country level fixed effects are 
included, these results do not persist due to the lack of within country variation of plough use 
(See Table 8). 
 Comparable to female extent, living in a rural area is significantly associated with 
higher levels of male extent in all three specifications of the model when using country level 
fixed effects (See Table 8), but these results are consistent, even if there are lower levels of 
significances, without fixed effects.  Male extent of acceptance decreases as a household gets 
wealthier, regardless of female responses (See Table 5).   
 Male years of education and male age have a statistically significant inverse relationship 
with male extent of acceptance of IPV, regardless of female acceptance.  A female partner who 
is more accepting of violence does not influence her male partner’s attitudes in these cases 
(Table 7). 
 As an additional check of the relationship between patriarchal societies and male extent 
of acceptance, we include country-level plough use variables from Alesina et al., 2013 (See 
Table 12).  The coefficients on the plough variable are positive and significant at the 1% level 
for the unconditional regression and when a female partner believes IPV is justifiable.   
 The primary outcome of interest is the disagreement measure, created by measuring the 
angle between the two vectors of the couple’s responses to the IPV questions.  I created two 
1x10 vectors include yes or no responses and I don’t know responses, in order to cover the 
different combinations of answers to these five questions by a couple.  Using the cosine 
similarity formula, I was then able to calculate the angle between the two vectors.  A larger 
value for the angle indicates a couple disagrees with each other about the acceptant of IPV to a 
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higher degree.  The smaller the angle measure, the more the couple agrees across the five 
scenarios. 
 In the DHS sample with the EA included, the largest angle is 155° and the smallest is 
0°, indicating the couple completely agrees with each other (See Figure 2).  This agreement 
could either be all ‘yes’, all ‘no’, or all ‘I don’t know’.  An analysis can be conducted of which 
variables drive the acceptance gap within a couple using this disagreement measure.   
From the unconditional regression, we see that being in an ethnic group that has 
ancestral plough usage makes a couple more likely to disagree with each other concerning 
intimate partner violence; this holds with and without fixed effects (See Tables 9 and 10).  This 
is also true when the regression is conditional on female ‘yes’ and male ‘yes’.  Even though 
there is not a significant relationship between the plough indicator and the disagreement 
measure when the regression is conditional on a partner responding ‘no’, the signs on the 
coefficients are consistent with the other three specifications (See Table 10). 
For wealth, female age, female education, male education, and rural location, we see the 
opposite sign from the expected relationship if the regression is conditional on either the female 
or male saying ‘yes’ violence is acceptable.  Otherwise we do see the expected relationship 
between these socioeconomic variables and disagreement within a couple.  A one-year increase 
in female age is associated with a decrease in disagreement; a one year increase in female and 
male education is associated with a decrease in disagreement; and moving up the wealth index 
is associated with a decrease in disagreement—conditional on the partner saying ‘no’ or being 
the unconditional regression.  
If a household is in a rural area, a couple is more likely to disagree with each other, 
unless the regression is conditional on either female or male saying ‘yes’.  In those cases, the 
couple is likely to disagree less.  As a household moves up the wealth index, couples are less 
likely to disagree with each other; however, couples are more likely to disagree when either 
partner believes IPV is acceptable in any of the scenarios.  These economic variables indicate 
there is some underlying relationship between poverty and the justification of intimate partner 
violence, which is consistent with the existing literature, but also adds that disagreement also 
has an intricate relationship with the beliefs in a household (See Table 6). 
From the three outcome variables, a clearer picture of long run determinants of 
gendered social norms and violence can be drawn.  The long run factors that shape patriarchal 
ethnic groups are related to two broad changes:  either the female in the partnership will 
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internalize violence and become more accepting of it, or the male will, but the increasing 
intrahousehold disagreement measure suggests this internalization is happening in different 
households.  It is unlikely both the male and female in an intimate relationship will internalize 
and accept violence at a higher extent.  This suggests that norm formation and enforcement are 
not as shared within a household as previously thought, yet the norms are still enforced 
elsewhere through different parts of the community internalizing violence. 
4.3 Short Run Economic Shocks 
As an additional source of short run variation, we include seasonal rainfall z-scores as a 
treatment that may influence any of the three outcomes of interest (See Table 13).  A z-score 
has been created for the current rainy season and the previous season. For female extent of 
acceptance, higher levels of rain this season and being in a patriarchal ethnic group leads to 
lower levels of acceptance of violence.  Contrastingly, it seems that positive rainfall shocks last 
season in more patriarchal societies tend to increase female extent of acceptance, with similar 
but statistically insignificant shifts in male attitudes.  
This opposite relationship is consistent with existing literature on shifts in bargaining 
power from income shocks and females’ adjusting social norms around intimate partner 
violence; however, this is an emerging area of study with a multitude of factors to include.  For 
example, the field has not yet decided on a unified manner in which to use precipitation 
information in the analysis.   
5. Conclusion 
This paper complements and adds to the literature on the acceptance of intimate partner 
violence, utilizing paired observations of females and males in order to examine intrahousehold 
dynamics concerning IPV.  Females are more accepting of IPV than their male partners, across 
five various scenarios.  This study contributes new information to the literature about long run 
and short run socioeconomic variables and the extent to which individuals believe IPV is 
justifiable, conditional on their partner’s beliefs.  An older female or a more educated female is 
less accepting of IPV, even if her male partner believes IPV is appropriate.  Due to this 
persisting relationship, education is a potential intervention point for policies and programs 
aimed at reducing the prevalence of IPV. 
This is the first study to include an intracouple analysis as well as a population level 
one.  This provides the opportunity to examine within household dynamics concerning 
acceptance of violence, creating a more full-bodied story about the factors influencing IPV.  It 
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is important to continue work at this level considering intimate partner violence exists within a 
couple. 
Additionally, we implement an ethnicity-level plough variable based on male ethnicity 
linked to the Ethnographic Atlas.  This is an attempt to expand on the work by Alesina et al., 
2013 that implements a country-level plough variable.  We find there is little variation and 
little advantage to using the individual plough variable when attempting to add depth to the 
data.  
Turning to the underlying mechanisms at work, the topic of social norms and 
bargaining power within a household is a complex area.  This study began examining the 
different dynamics within households when it comes to believing IPV is justified across short 
run and long run factors, but there is more to be done in uncovering the entire set of variables 
that influences these norms.  Mechanisms that determine these social norms are hard to isolate, 
but conditions like fear of retribution or social desirability bias needs to be considered.     
Accordingly, there is space in the literature for future causal impact studies in the area 
using a variety of exogenous shocks to households.  The estimates from this study show that 
ethnic groups with ancestral plough use tend to have more disagreement within couples 
concerning the acceptance of intimate partner violence, but a more rigorous exogenous source 
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Figures 3A – 3E:  Density Curves for Each Situation, by Education 
 
Figure 3A:  Neglects Children 
 
 
Figure 3B:  Goes Out 
 
 






Figure 3E:  Refuse Sex 
 
 
Figure 3F:  Burns Food 
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Table 2:  Sample Summary Statistics 
 




Female Age 31.48 30.45 
 (8.297) (8.116) 
 
  Male Age 37.44 38.05 
 (9.044) (9.263) 
 




  Female Education 5.086 3.628 
 (4.855) (4.474) 
 
  Male Education 6.318 5.043 
 (4.985) (5.049) 
 




  Rural Households 65.3% 70.4% 
 (0.476) (0.456) 
Wealth Index   
Poor 42.1% 43.5% 
 
(0.494) (0.496) 
   Middle 19.8% 19.8% 
 
(0.398) (0.398) 
   Rich 38.1% 36.8% 
 
(0.486) (0.482) 
N 437,873 102,569 
   Notes:  The means of the specified variables are 
calculated separately for the entire sample and for 
the sub-sample with matches to the Ethnographic 













Female   
Yes at All 0.462 0.573 
 
(0.499) (0.495) 
Goes Out 0.386 0.511 
 
(0.897) (0.974) 
Neglects Kids 0.418 0.517 
 
(0.908) (0.981) 
Argues 0.376 0.496 
 
(0.964) (1.017) 
Refuse Sex 0.351 0.483 
 
(1.108) (1.177) 




  Yes at All 0.316 0.359 
 
(0.465) (0.480) 
Goes Out 0.254 0.312 
 
(0.849) (0.917) 
Neglects Kids 0.276 0.314 
 
(0.847) (0.919) 
Argues 0.261 0.309 
 
(0.909) (0.985) 
Refuse Sex 0.187 0.247 
 
(0.905) (1.006) 
Burns Food 0.135 0.162 
 
(0.741) (0.836) 
N 432,507 102,174 
   Notes:  The means of the specified variables are 
calculated separately for the entire sample and 
for the sub-sample with matches to the 
Ethnographic Atlas by ethnicity.  The standard 
























Neglects Children       
Male 0.211 0.394 0.229 0.300 0.0880 0.226 
 
(0.101) (.) (0.123) (0.204) (0.0833) (0.139) 
       
Female 0.207 0.350 0.400 0.349 0.127 0.351 
 
(0.125) (.) (0.176) (0.216) (0.0847) (0.188) 
Goes Out 
      Male 0.176 0.336 0.199 0.253 0.0782 0.194 
 
(0.130) (.) (0.117) (0.211) (0.0792) (0.134) 
       Female 0.172 0.348 0.368 0.296 0.103 0.318 
 
(0.162) (.) (0.185) (0.247) (0.102) (0.201) 
Argues 
      Male 0.210 0.246 0.188 0.231 0.0359 0.181 
 
(0.156) (.) (0.109) (0.152) (0.0382) (0.123) 
       Female 0.140 0.266 0.342 0.264 0.0504 0.283 
 
(0.110) (.) (0.179) (0.239) (0.0392) (0.197) 
Refuse Sex 
      Male 0.0548 0.0667 0.126 0.103 0.0290 0.108 
 
(0.0453) (.) (0.0852) (0.0865) (0.0249) (0.0841) 
       Female 0.0593 0.100 0.290 0.157 0.0478 0.230 
 
(0.0580) (.) (0.171) (0.148) (0.0492) (0.180) 
Burns Food 
      Male 0.0235 0.0328 0.0803 0.0939 0.0200 0.0706 
 
(0.0241) (.) (0.0648) (0.102) (0.0163) (0.0685) 
       Female 0.0418 0.0844 0.202 0.143 0.0425 0.162 
 
(0.0471) (.) (0.133) (0.133) (0.0300) (0.134) 
       N 8 1 75 15 10 113 
       
Notes:  The means of the specified variables are calculated based on the country-year level mean.  
The standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 5:  Female Extent of Acceptance, Conditional on Male Partner Acceptance 
with No Fixed Effects 
 
--- Pooled OLS on Repeated Cross Sections, Clustered Standard Errors at Ethnicity Level--- 
  
Male IPV Dummy 
 
Total NO YES 
    Plough Dummy 0.290** 0.299* 0.117 
 
(0.131) (0.161) (0.118) 
    Wealth Index -0.100*** -0.120*** -0.0734*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.026) 
    Female Age -0.0254*** -0.0270*** -0.0210*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
    Male Age 0.0196*** 0.0214*** 0.0191*** 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
    Female Education -0.0747*** -0.0671*** -0.0705*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
    Male Education -0.0276*** -0.0238*** -0.0229*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
    Rural 0.0802 0.0345 0.162*** 
 
(0.051) (0.055) (0.056) 
    Constant 2.337*** 2.159*** 2.384*** 
 
(0.142) (0.141) (0.156) 
    N 95,398 55,399 29,842 
Outcome Mean 1.718 1.426 2.139 
 
Note:  Outcome variable is the female extent of acceptance; it can take on the values 0 – 5.  The 
male dummy variable is any amount of female acceptance; it can take on the values 0 or 1.  Column 
(1) is the unconditional sample.  Column (2) is conditional on a male partner never accepting. 
Column (3) is conditional on a male partner accepting IPV.  Standard errors are in parentheses & 
clustered at the ethnicity level. No fixed effects.  *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Table 6:  Female Extent, Conditional on Male Partner Acceptance with Fixed 
Effects 
 
  ---OLS with Country Fixed Effects, Clustered Standard Errors at Ethnicity Level--- 
  
Male IPV Dummy 
 
Total NO YES 
    Plough Dummy -0.120 -0.0921 -0.238 
 
(0.188) (0.176) (0.146) 
    Wealth Index -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.102*** 
(0.0171) (0.0214) (0.0137) 
   Female Age -0.00937*** -0.0108*** -0.00501* 
 
(0.00172) (0.00244) (0.00257) 
    Male Age 0.00373** 0.00398** 0.00566** 
 
(0.00143) (0.00199) (0.00240) 
    Female Education -0.0495*** -0.0490*** -0.0394*** 
(0.00427) (0.00494) (0.00443) 
    Male Education -0.0122*** -0.0116*** -0.00480 
 
(0.00275) (0.00351) (0.00336) 
    Rural 0.190*** 0.200*** 0.175*** 
 
(0.0329) (0.0277) (0.0583) 
    N 95,398 55,398 29,841 
Outcome Mean 1.718 1.426 2.139 
 
Note:  Column (2) is conditional on a male partner never saying IPV is acceptable.  Column (3) is 
conditional on a male partner saying IPV is acceptable in any situation.  Standard errors are in 





Table 7:  Male Extent of Acceptance, Conditional on Female Partner Acceptance 
with No Fixed Effects 
 
--- Pooled OLS on Repeated Cross Sections, Clustered Standard Errors at Ethnicity Level--- 
  
Female IPV Dummy 
 
Total NO YES 
    Plough Dummy 0.531*** 0.310** 0.561*** 
 
(0.151) (0.124) (0.156) 
    Wealth Index -0.0820*** -0.0688*** -0.0822*** 
 
(0.00911) (0.00991) (0.0125) 
    Female Age -0.00107 -0.00247 0.00243 
 
(0.00250) (0.00203) (0.00308) 
    Male Age -0.00811*** -0.00515** -0.0114*** 
 
(0.00235) (0.00205) (0.00271) 
    Female Education -0.0177** -0.0107* -0.0104* 
 
(0.00719) (0.00540) (0.00588) 
    Male Education -0.0162*** -0.0143*** -0.0153*** 
 
(0.00210) (0.00253) (0.00207) 
    Rural 0.0701* 0.0151 0.103** 
 
(0.0388) (0.0359) (0.0447) 
    Constant 1.353*** 1.089*** 1.451*** 
 
(0.0922) (0.0910) (0.0857) 
    N 95,398 40,210 52,813 
Outcome Mean 0.762 0.503 0.963 
 
Note:  Outcome variable is the male extent of acceptance; it can take on the values 0 – 5.  The 
female dummy variable is any amount of female acceptance; it can take on the values 0 or 1.  
Column (1) is the unconditional sample.  Column (2) is conditional on a female partner never 
accepting. Column (3) is conditional on a female partner accepting IPV.  Standard errors are in 




Table 8:  Male Extent, Conditional on Female Acceptance  
  
     ---OLS with Country Fixed Effects, Clustered Standard Errors at Ethnicity Level--- 
  
Female IPV Dummy 
 
Total NO YES 
    Plough Dummy -0.0364 -0.0160 -0.0578 
 
(0.196) (0.127) (0.211) 
    Household Wealth  
Index 
-0.0658*** -0.0477*** -0.0664*** 
(0.0158) (0.0118) (0.0187) 
   Female Age -0.00377** -0.00343** -0.00335* 
 
(0.00144) (0.00137) (0.00179) 
    Male Age -0.00475*** -0.00439*** -0.00509*** 
 
(0.00109) (0.00116) (0.00145) 
    Female Education -0.0169*** -0.0141*** -0.0163*** 
 
(0.00255) (0.00260) (0.00319) 
    Male Education -0.0240*** -0.0192*** -0.0270*** 
 
(0.00225) (0.00210) (0.00329) 
    Rural 0.0762*** 0.0507** 0.0780** 
 
(0.0282) (0.0239) (0.0380) 
    N 95,398 42,585 52,813 
Outcome Mean 0.762 0.503 0.963 
 
Note:  Column (2) is conditional on a female partner never saying IPV is acceptable.  Column (3) is 
conditional on a female partner saying IPV is acceptable in any situation.  Standard errors are in 





Table 9:  Couple’s Disagreement Measure, Conditional on Couple Acceptance 
 





  Plough Dummy 0.111*** 
 
(0.0268) 
  Wealth Index -0.0252*** 
 
(0.00336) 
  Female Age -0.00398*** 
 
(0.000835) 
  Male Age 0.00105 
 
(0.000818) 
  Female Education -0.0130*** 
 
(0.00259) 
  Male Education -0.00522*** 
 
(0.00130) 
  Rural 0.0138 
 
(0.0169) 
  Constant 0.800*** 
 
(0.0260) 
  N 80,033 
Outcome Mean 0.597 
  
Note:  Column (1) uses the disagreement measure as the outcome 
variable.  Standard errors are in parentheses & clustered at the 




Table 10:  Couple’s Disagreement Measure, Conditional on Couple Acceptance  
 
      ---OLS with Country Fixed Effects, Clustered Standard Errors at Ethnicity Level--- 
  
Female Extent Male Extent 
 
Total NO YES NO YES 
      Plough Dummy 0.0664* 0.0274 0.0596*** 0.0524 0.0864*** 
(0.0387) (0.0486) (0.0183) (0.0463) (0.0242) 
 
     Wealth Index -0.0209*** -0.0145*** 0.0110*** -0.0271*** 0.0163*** 
(0.00214) (0.00270) (0.00298) (0.00350) (0.00390) 
      Female Age -0.00255*** -0.00169*** 0.000886*** -0.00289*** 0.000886 
 
(0.000482) (0.000556) (0.000319) (0.000637) (0.000542) 
      Male Age -0.000708* -0.00182*** -0.000358 0.000518 -0.000745 
 
(0.000373) (0.000524) (0.000317) (0.000487) (0.000542) 
      Female Education -0.0118*** -0.00536*** 0.00520*** -0.0119*** 0.00501*** 
 
(0.00133) (0.000844) (0.000626) (0.00150) (0.000902) 
      Male Education -0.00487*** -0.00687*** 0.00322*** -0.00303*** 0.00371*** 
 
(0.000869) (0.000840) (0.000488) (0.00107) (0.000670) 
      Rural 0.0412*** 0.0256*** -0.0196*** 0.0410*** -0.0197* 
 
(0.00960) (0.00766) (0.00632) (0.00916) (0.00995) 
      N 76,921 36,847 40,074 53,441 23,478 
      
Note:  Column (2) is conditional on a female partner never saying IPV is acceptable.  Column (3) is 
conditional on a female partner saying IPV is acceptable in any situation.  Column (4) is 
conditional on a male partner never saying IPV is acceptable.  Column (5) is conditional on a male 
partner saying IPV is acceptable in any situation.  Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered 
at the ethnicity level. Country level fixed effects.  *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Table 11:  Female Extent, Conditional on Male Partner Acceptance with 
Ancestral Controls 
---OLS with No Fixed Effects, Clustered Standard Errors at Ethnicity Level--- 
  Male IPV Dummy 
 
Total NO YES 
    Country Level Plough 0.300 0.222 0.806*** 
 
(0.234) (0.283) (0.224) 
    Agricultural Suitability -0.468 -0.574* 0.302 
 
(0.292) (0.322) (0.368) 
    Tropical Climate 0.807* 0.863* 1.388*** 
 
(0.461) (0.454) (0.412) 
    Large Animals -0.231 -0.447 0.707 
 
(0.663) (0.648) (0.664) 
    Political Hierarchies 0.0789 0.171 -0.234* 
 
(0.130) (0.136) (0.131) 
    Constant 1.800*** 1.621*** 0.683 
 
(0.547) (0.549) (0.648) 
    N 95563 55516 29889 
    
Note:  Outcome variable is the female extent of acceptance; it can take on the values 0 – 5.  The 
male dummy variable is any amount of female acceptance; it can take on the values 0 or 1.  Column 
(1) is the unconditional sample.  Column (2) is conditional on a male partner never accepting. 
Column (3) is conditional on a male partner accepting IPV.  Same vector of controls is included but 
not reported here.  Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at ethnicity level. No fixed effects.  




Table 12:  Male Extent, Conditional on Female Partner Acceptance with 
Ancestral Controls 
 
---OLS with No Fixed Effects, Clustered Standard Errors at Ethnicity Level--- 
  Female IPV Dummy 
 
Total NO YES 
    Country Level Plough 0.492*** 0.0915 0.690*** 
 
(0.138) (0.120) (0.131) 
    Agricultural Suitability -0.341* -0.471*** -0.0846 
 
(0.173) (0.147) (0.177) 
    Tropical Climate -0.464* -0.510*** -0.822** 
 
(0.246) (0.163) (0.349) 
    Large Animals -1.572*** -1.209*** -1.742*** 
 
(0.413) (0.252) (0.568) 
    Political Hierarchies 0.0509 0.105 -0.0665 
 
(0.0984) (0.0753) (0.122) 
    Constant 3.326*** 2.745*** 4.075*** 
 
(0.395) (0.301) (0.459) 
    N 95563 40391 52785 
    
Note:  Outcome variable is the male extent of acceptance; it can take on the values 0 – 5.  
The female dummy variable is any amount of female acceptance; it can take on the values 
0 or 1.  Column (1) is the unconditional sample.  Column (2) is conditional on a female 
partner never accepting. Column (3) is conditional on a female partner accepting IPV.   
Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the ethnicity level. No fixed effects.  




Table 13:  Rainfall Shocks in Patriarchal Societies  
 
---OLS with Region and Year Fixed Effects, Clustered Standard Errors at Region Level--- 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Disagreement Female Extent Male Extent 
    Lagged Seasonal Rainfall z-score -0.00923 -0.0552 0.0878 
 
(0.0127) (0.0641) (0.0821) 
    Lagged Seasonal Rainfall z-score X 
Plough Dummy 
-0.00950 0.304** 0.162 
(0.0809) (0.122) (0.197) 
    Current Seasonal Rainfall z-score -0.00983 -0.0868 -0.00815 
 
(0.0154) (0.0527) (0.0675) 
    Current Seasonal Rainfall z-score X 
Plough Dummy 
-0.0833 -0.255*** -0.162 
(0.0568) (0.0932) (0.143) 
    N 127,616 174,511 174,511 
Outcome Mean 0.538 1.550 0.518 
    Note:  Column (1) uses the disagreement measure as the outcome variable.  Column (2) 
uses the female extent of acceptance as the outcome variable.  Column (3) uses the male 
extent of acceptance as the outcome variable.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Region 
and year fixed effects.  *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
  
 
